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EDITORS INTRODUCTION

ACK in 1951 when the Office of Research and Reports was just being set up, the then Assistant Director, Max F. Millikan, wrote a long paper for his staff on the functions and methods of economic intelligence. In it, he spelled out the reasons for ORR's existence, its major and minor tasks, and the methods by which these tasks might best be performed. The paper was, in effect, marching orders for a new organization as it embarked on its job.

We have here printed the greater part of Dr. Millikan's paper, without any substantial changes and without any attempt to bring it "up-to-date." Why? First of all, not because Dr. Millikan was the first AD/RR; and second, not because the paper was an official document defining ORR's operating principles. Indeed, recalling that Studies in Intelligence will publish only unofficial, individual contributions to basic intelligence doctrine, we are printing Dr. Millikan's paper in some sense despite these facts about its author and its original purpose. Our reason for publishing the paper is this: it is, we feel, a distinguished contribution to the study of intelligence analysis methodology. And its application is by no means limited to economic intelligence; the same order of analytic problems, the same problems of sources, extent of information, competing requirements, liaison and coordination arise in any intelligence activity. The same problem Dr. Millikan addresses, that of building authoritative knowledge out of fragmentary sources, is perhaps the central problem of the intelligence process as a whole.

There is no need to rehearse in detail Dr. Millikan's qualifications for tackling such problems. He was for several years a senior official of this Agency and is now Director of the Center for International Studies at M.I.T., an organization that has conducted important research on Soviet and World Communist affairs since its inception in 1951.

Mr. Howerton's paper complements Dr. Millikan's, on two levels. On the level of economic intelligence research, it gives a current view of the methods devised since 1951 for analyzing, in successive approximations to the complete picture, the Soviet economy; it is, thus, in effect, a case-study of the method of successive approximations described in broad terms by Dr. Millikan. On a more general level, Mr. Howerton's paper provides a survey of the amazing diversity of research techniques available to the intelligence analyst and of the potentialities of overt (or, at least, easily obtainable) information—if only the analyst knows what to do with the resources available to him.

Mr. Howerton joined this Agency in 1951 after a career in corporate and private research organizations. He possesses a unique combined competence in chemistry, mathematics, and languages and is fellow of more than a score of national and international professional associations. Mr. Howerton is, at present, Assistant to the Deputy Director/Intelligence (Planning).

In this issue we also inaugurate a continuing feature, a Notes and Comments Department. We have received a number of letters on the first two issues — many, in themselves, substantial contributions to thinking about intelligence principles and methods. Of these, we here publish two, both on the subject of "capabilities" and responsive to the January issue of Studies in Intelligence. Maj. Gen. John A. Samford is Director of Intelligence, U. S. Air Force; Mr. Alan J. P. Crick is JIC (London) Representative to this Agency. We are grateful to both for permitting us to publish their comments. And we very much hope that, as subsequent issues appear, we will keep on receiving your comments, criticisms, and suggestions — publishable or not. We would like to know what you think of the series.